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BEYOND "THE WALL":
THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM
AND GLASS-STEAGALL REFORM
The character of the United States banking system was funda-
mentally altered by the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act1 ("Glass-
Steagall" or the "Act"), which effected the divorce of commercial
Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
Although the Glass-Steagall Act ("Glass-Steagall" or the "Act") is the popular name for the
Banking Act of 1933, the term "Glass-Steagall" is most often used to refer to four key sec-
tions of the Act-sections 16, 20, 21 and 32. Congress enacted these four provisions "to
separate commercial banking from investment banking because affiliations between these
institutions were perceived as a main factor contributing to the stock market crash of 1929
and the Great Depression." See Norton, Up Against "The Wall". Glass-Steagall and the
Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Regulated") Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327, 327
(1987). "Congress became concerned that banks had placed customer deposits at unaccept-
able risks by buying, selling, and underwriting questionably sound securities." Id. at 329. By
separating the two types of banking, "Congress sought to restore public confidence in the
commercial banking system." Id. at 327.
Section 16 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited
to purchasing and selling 'such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon
the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account,
and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. II 1984) (section 16 of the Act, as amended). Although the
broad prohibitions of this provision expressly govern only the activities of national banks,
the Federal Reserve Act extends these same prohibitions to state-chartered banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve system ("state member banks"). See 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982).
A number of exceptions are contained in section 16 pursuant to which banks may en-
gage in limited securities activities. Underwriting of specified federal, state and local securi-
ties is open to banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. II 1984). Also, banks may
purchase these and other qualified securities for their own accounts. See id.
Section 20 of the Act prohibits member bank aff tion with any firm "engaged princi-
pally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, o. istribution at wholesale or retail or
through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities." 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1982) (section 20 of the Act, as amended).
Under section 21 any firm "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing . . . securities" may not accept deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (Supp. II
1984) (section 21 of the Act, as amended).
Section 32 excludes officers, directors, and employees of securities firms from concur-
rently holding similar positions in member banks unless the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve finds that "it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such mem-
ber bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments." 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)
(section 32 of the Act, as amended).
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banking2 from certain activities associated with investment bank-
ing.' Glass-Steagall was enacted in the aftermath of the Great De-
pression and it was commonly believed that a principal reason for
the collapse of the financial system was excessive bank involve-
ment in investment banking. Commentators perceived the exis-
tence of inherent conflicts of interest and excessive risks associated
with the securities industry.4 The last quarter century has been
marked by a gradual retreat from the absolute separation imple-
mented by the Act's Depression-era drafters. 5 Currently, a well-
documented debate rages in the courts and the legislature concern-
ing the efficacy of the Glass-Steagall "wall" and its continued via-
bility in the modern American financial system. This Note will un-
dertake a review of the Act's evolution in response to the impetus
provided by the changing economic and financial environment,6
2 Commercial banking is generally understood to encompass acceptance of demand de-
posits, savings deposits and time deposits, as well as the extension of long- and short-term
credit to businesses and consumers. See J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 34-36 (1976). Commercial
bank trust departments also engage in a wide range of fiduciary services. Id. For a thorough
discussion of commercial banking, see generally E. REED, R. COTTER, E. GILL, & R. SMITH,
COMMERCIAL BANKING (1976).
3 Investment banking involves the underwriting and distribution of securities. See 1 L
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 159-78 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969) (overview of investment
banking and distribution techniques).
' See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137, 144-45 (1984) [hereinafter Bankers Trust 1]. The Court noted that the failure of the
Bank of the United States was primarily caused by its investment banking activities. Id. at
145, n.4. Due to a perceived inherent conflict between investment and commercial banking,
Congress rejected legislation which would merely regulate bank securities activities in favor
of the Glass-Steagall "wall." Id. at 147.
1 See Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANKING L.J. 483 (1971) (reviewing legislative history). For example, the 1932 Democratic
campaign platform had called for a complete separation of the two industries. See id. at 518.
' This changing financial and economic environment can be demonstrated by an analy-
sis of leading economic indicators. When measured by return on assets, bank profitability
has generally fallen since 1970, when the indicator was first measured at .89 percent. See
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY:
A STAFF STUDY 9 (1986) [hereinafter BANK PROFITABILITY]. By 1984, the figure had fallen to
.64 percent. Id. This decline in profitability has been attributed to the general economic
climate of the 1980's, "permanent" structural factors, the recent need to increase bank
reserves to support low quality loans and the changing composition of the package of prod-
ucts offered by commercial banks. Id. at 16.
Banks have also suffered a decline in market share in fields which they have tradition-
ally dominated. For instance, the years from 1966 through 1986 witnessed an eighteen per-
cent decline in the bank's share with regard to the supplying of the short- and medium-term
credit needs of domestic non-financial corporations. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COR-
PORATION, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 8 (preliminary
draft, Aug. 18, 1987) [hereinafter MANDATE FOR CHANGE]. Much of this loss may be attrib-
uted to corporate issuance of commercial paper as a substitute for seeking credit in the form
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the challenges presented by the securities industry7 and the regula-
tory, judicial and legislative climates, which have become increas-
ingly receptive to change. Part I contains a review of regulatory
and judicial decisions which have vastly expanded the scope of
permissible securities activities of bank affiliates.8 Part II examines
of commercial loans from banks. Id. at 9.
Commercial paper consists of "unsecured note[s] payable to the bearer on a stated ma-
turity date between one and ninety days after issuance." Norton, supra note 1, at 343. This
growth in the commercial paper markets is reflected in statistics which show a rise in the
dollar value of such issues, increasing from $8.8 billion in 1973 to $71.3 billion in 1984. See
BANK PROFITAmLrrY, supra, at 167. During the same period, the value of commercial and
industrial loans held by domestic commercial banks showed a markedly smaller increase,
rising from $147.5 billion to $373.2 billion. Id.
Other developments in financial markets have also contributed to the banking indus-
try's demands for increased power to permit their full participation in financial markets.
Advances in technology, such as the electronic communications network, have made invest-
ment with nonbank institutions an attractive alternative for the customer. See Langevoort,
Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in
Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 678-79 (1987).
7 Both the Investment Company Institute, a trade association of the mutual fund in-
dustry, and the Securities Industry Association, a trade association of the investment bank-
ing industry, have repeatedly challenged regulatory expansion of permissible bank and bank
affiliate activities in a series of judicial decisions. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 207 (1984) (acquisition by bank of
affiliate which participates in discount brokerage activity) [hereinafter Schwab]; Bankers
Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 137 (1984) (bank marketing of corporate customers' commercial pa-
per); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 46
(1981) (bank affiliate as investment adviser to closed-end investment company) [hereinafter
ICI]; Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (combined services of discount brokerage and investment advice provided
by bank affiliate), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988) [hereinafter NatWest].
8 See infra notes 16-73 and accompanying text. Regulation of banks and their affiliates
is accomplished at the federal level by utilization of the concept of the "primary regulator."
See PUBLIC INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR REGULATORS (1987). The agency which is to regulate a particular
bank is predicated on two considerations: the type of bank, such as, national, state member,
etc.; and the area of regulation, such as, chartering, reserve requirements, deposit insurance,
etc. See id.
The activities of bank affiliates are governed by the provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50
(1982)). Regulatory supervision of bank holding companies is vested in the Federal Reserve
Board. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). Section 1842(a) provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful, except with the prior approval of the [Federal Reserve]
Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to become a bank
holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank to become a
subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) for any bank holding company to ac-
quire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any bank if,
after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly own or control
more than 5 per centum of the voting shares of such bank; (4) for any bank hold-
ing company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire all or substan-
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the impact of the moratorium, contained in the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987,' on the expansion of bank securities
activities. In addition, an analysis of various proposals for reform
which have been advanced by the legislative branch, commentators
and industry spokespersons is considered. Finally, this Note will
advocate change while stressing the need for a restructuring of the
regulatory system in light of the differing objectives of the banking
and securities statutory schemes.10
The scope of this Note primarily encompasses the securities
tially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding company to merge or
consolidate with any other bank holding company.
Id. An entity, except as provided in section 1841(a)(5), is a bank holding company within
the meaning of the statute if it has "control over any bank or over any company that is or
becomes a bank holding company." Id. § 1841(a)(1).
The Federal Reserve also exercises supervision over bank holding company affiliation
with nonbanking entities. See id. § 1843. Section 1843 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no bank holding company shall-
... retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any
company which is not a bank or bank holding company or engage in any activities
other than (A) those of banking or of managing or controlling banks and other
subsidiaries authorized under this chapter or of furnishing services to or perform-
ing services for its subsidiaries, and (B) those permitted under paragraph (8) of
subsection (c) of this section.
Id. § 1843(a). The activities permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) are those "which the
Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation)
to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper inci-
dent thereto." Id. § 1843(c)(8). The analysis required by this section has been frequently
used to permit banking organizations to engage in nonbanking activities by locating such
activities in their nonbanking subsidiaries. See, e.g., Schwab, 468 U.S. 207, 207 (1984) (Fed-
eral Reserve Board can authorize bank holding company acquisition of nonbank affiliate
engaged principally in retail securities brokerage). However, to authorize such conduct, the
Federal Reserve must make a separate finding that such conduct does not violate section 20
of the Glass-Steagall Act. See id. at 213.
9 Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
10 Our system of bank regulation is intended primarily to preserve the integrity of the
banking system by guarding against bank failures. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 680-81.
In contrast, United States securities legislation aims to protect the interests of the individ-
ual investor and the securities markets. See Norton, supra note 1, at 341. This distinction
serves as a principal rationale underlying the contention that the expansion of bank powers
requires a new regulatory structure designed along functional lines. Cf. CoMMrrrER ON Gov-
ERNMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MODERNIZA-
TION OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY: A PLAN FOR CAPITAL MOBILITY WITHIN A FRAME-
WORK OF SAFE AND SOUND BANKING 81-82 (1987) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. The
Committee Report recommended that responsibility for enforcement of securities laws gov-
erning financial holding companies and their subsidiaries be given to the Securities Ex-
change Commission. See id. at 81. With respect to banks and thrift institutions, it advocates
that the SEC be allowed to delegate its enforcement power to other regulators. See id. at 81-
82.
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activities of bank holding company affiliates,11 and includes only a
cursory examination of those engaged in by thrift institutions,12
"nonbank banks," 13 national and state member banks14 and state
nonmember banks.'
5
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPANSION
OF BANK SECURITIES POWERS
The Supreme Court's first interpretation of a Glass-Steagall
provision occurred thirteen years after the statute's enactment in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew. l" In
Agnew, the Court interpreted the "primarily engaged" standard of
section 32.'1 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (the
1' See supra note 8.
12 Thrift institutions include savings banks and savings and loan associations. See 12
U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982). Federally chartered thrift institutions are permitted to engage in
non-banking activities, such as investing in "service corporation" subsidiaries, subject to the
rules and regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"). See id. §
1464(c)(4)(B). Generally, service corporations may engage in businesses which the FHLBB
finds "reasonably related to the activities of Federal associations." See 12 C.F.R. § 545.74(c)
(1987).
13 The concept of "nonbank banks" was developed as a result of a loophole in the Bank
Holding Company Act, which defined a bank as an institution which both "accepts deposits
that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and ... engages in the busi-
ness of making commercial loans." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). By owning an affiliate which
technically engaged in only one of these activities, an organization could escape classifica-
tion as a bank holding company and permissibly engage in nonbanking activities. See Com-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27. Section 101 of the Comparative Equality Banking Act
of 1987 closes the nonbank bank loophole by redefining a bank, with certain exceptions, as
any of the following: "(A) [a]n insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Act ... [or] [a]n institution ... which both ... accepts demand deposits or
deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third
parties or others; and... is engaged in the business of making commercial loans." Pub. L.
No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552, 554 (1987).
1 Although banking entities have engaged in expanded securities activities pursuant to
determinations by the Comptroller of the Currency that such activities are consistent with
Glass-Steagall, most commentators advocate placing such businesses in bank affiliates. See
infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. For a general discussion regarding the effect of
Glass-Steagall on national and state member banks, see supra note 1.
1" Section 103 of the Comparative Equality Banking Act of 1987 extends the prohibi-
tions of sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act to state nonmember banks, if they are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). See Pub. L. No. 100-86,
101 Stat. 552, 556-67 (1987).
16 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
17 Section 32 provides in relevant part-
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association,
no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged
in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or
retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securi-
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"Board") decided to remove certain directors of a national bank
from office based on their status as employees of a firm "primarily
engaged" in underwriting securities.'" Upholding the Board's con-
struction of the statute, the Court refused to limit the section 32
prohibition to only those firms which derived more than fifty per-
cent of their gross income from underwriting activities. Rather, the
Court interpreted the statute as requiring only that such activity
be "substantial."' 19
Twenty-four years later, in Investment Company Institute v.
Camp,2 0 the Supreme Court invoked Glass-Steagall to invalidate
portions of a regulation promulgated by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency ("OCC"). Camp involved Regulation 9,2"
which purported to authorize banks to operate open-end invest-
ment funds.22 Petitioners, an association of open-end investment
companies 2s and various individual companies, challenged, as vio-
lative of sections 16 and 21 of the Act, the provisions of Regulation9 and the OCC's approval of an application made by First National
ties, shall serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member
bank ....
12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982). This section allows the Federal Reserve to exempt persons from this
prohibition upon a finding that the situation "would not unduly influence the investment
policies" of the bank. Id.
"8 See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 444 (1947).
The respondents had been employed by the firm since 1941, and had remained in its employ
after their election to the bank's board of directors. Id. at 445. While serving as directors,
however, none of the respondents did business with the bank "other than [on] a strictly
commission business with its customers," nor did the firm itself do business with the bank.
Id. at 445-46.
19 See id. at 446-47. Refusing to use a strictly quantitative test to measure substantial-
ity, the Court referred to the "legislative purpose" of the Act:
Section 32 is directed to the probability or likelihood .. . that a bank director
interested in the underwriting business may use his influence in the bank to in-
volve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting house has in its port-
folio .... That likelihood or probability does not depend on whether the firm's
underwriting business exceeds 50 per cent of its total business. It might, of course,
exist whatever the proportion of the underwriting business.
Id. at 447.
20 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
21 12 C.F.R. pt. 9 (1970).
22 Camp, 401 U.S. at 618-19. The regulation permitted "managing agency accounts"
which involved the "collective investment of monies delivered to the bank for investment
management." See id. at 622.
23 See id. at 612. Open-end investment companies are commonly referred to as mutual
funds and typically permit investors to redeem their shares from the issuer. Id. at 625 n.11.
See also ICI, 450 U.S. 46, 51 (1981) (distinguishing open-end and closed-end investment
companies).
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City Bank of New York to operate such a fund.24 After finding that
petitioners had standing to bring the action,25 the Court held that
the fund approved by the OCC involved the bank in underwriting,
issuing, selling and distribution of securities, activities proscribed
by sections 16 and 21.26 The Court referred to Congress' intent to
eliminate both the "obvious danger[s]" and "subtle hazards ' 27 cre-
ated by commercial bank involvement in the securities business.
Prior to Camp, banks had been permitted to engage in commin-
gling of trust assets, as well as providing services as managing
agent and purchasing securities for the account of customers.28
However, the Court chose to broadly apply the prohibitions of sec-
2, Camp, 401 U.S. at 618-19. Pursuant to the First National City Bank managing
agency accounts plan, customers would purchase freely redeemable "units of participation"
in amounts ranging from $10,000 to $500,000. See id. at 622. The customers' investments
would be pooled in a fund and the bank would act as managing agent. Id. In addition, the
fund would register as an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940
and file a registration statement with the SEC. See id. at 622-23. The bank would serve as
the underwriter of the fund's "units of participation." See id.
22 Id. at 620-21. The Court based its finding upon its holding in Association of Data
Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (data processing companies had standing to
challenge Comptroller's ruling allowing banks to provide data processing services), conclud-
ing that Glass-Steagall arguably prohibited the type of competition between banks and the
mutual fund industry, from which petitioners suffered injury. Camp, 401 U.S. at 620-21.
28 Camp, 401 U.S. at 639. 0CC had argued that the prohibitions of sections 16 an 21
were inapplicable because the "units of participation" held by individual customers were
not securities within the meaning of Glass-Steagall. See id. at 634. The Court rejected such
a narrow construction of the term "securities" as it found "direct evidence that Congress
specifically contemplated that the word 'security' includes an interest in an investment
fund." See id. at 635.
27 Id. at 630. In an often quoted passage, the Court stated:
The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to the obvious danger
that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or
security investments .... The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows
that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards
that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary
or managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly or
by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments.
Id. The Court listed the following "subtle hazards" which Congress envisioned if the com-
mercial banking business extended beyond the Glass-Steagall limits: (1) problems of public
confidence resulting from poor performance by an affiliate; (2) expenditure of bank assets to
aid an ailing affiliate; (3) extension of unsound or preferential credit to companies involved
with the securities affiliate; (4) loss of good will of customers suffering losses in transactions
entered into with the affiliate after relying on the bank-affiliate relationship; (5) damage to
commercial banks' reputation for prudence and restraint; (6) excessive loans to customers
for the purpose of purchasing securities; (7) purchases by the bank's trust department of
excessive affiliate holdings; and (8) the bank's impaired ability to render disinterested in-
vestment advice. Id. at 630-33.
218 Id. at 624-25.
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tions 16 and 21 by preventing banks from concurrently conducting
these activities within the framework of an open-end investment
fund.29
Following Camp, the Board amended Regulation Y, 30 and is-
sued an intbrpretive ruling thereunder permitting bank affiliates to
act as investment advisors to closed-end investment companies.3 1
The amendment and ruling were challenged by the mutual fund
industry and upheld in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute"2 ("ICI"). Unlike Camp,
ICI involved bank affiliate activity, implicating section 20 of Glass-
Steagall and section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.3 3
The Investment Company Institute contended that the proposed
activity failed to satisfy the "proper incident to banking" analysis
required by the Bank Holding Company Act because, if conducted
by the bank itself, the activity in question would contravene sec-
2 See id. at 625. The Court held that although the differences between a bank's trust
powers and the operation of an open-end mutual fund are subtle, the different character of
the two activities warrant distinction. Id.
-- 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(ii) (1980).
31 See id. § 225.125(c). The amendment made the following addition to its list of per-
missible bank activities: "(ii) serving as investment adviser, as defined in section 2(a)(20) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940, to an investment company registered under that
Act." Id. § 225.4(b)(5)(ii).
3- 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
" 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1987). See supra note 8 for a discussion of this section.
The analysis employed by the Federal Reserve in determining whether an affiliate's
nonbanking activity is permissible involves two questions. The first question is whether the
activity is violative of the prohibitions contained in sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. Here, the Federal Reserve must determine if the affiliate would be "engaged princi-
pally" in underwriting, issuance, flotation, public sale or distribution of securities. 12 U.S.C.
§ 377 (1982).
In addition, the Federal Reserve must analyze the bank affiliate activity in view of
Bank Holding Company Act considerations. It must determine whether the activity is
"closely related to banking." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. 1987). In making this determina-
tion, the Federal Reserve generally employs the criteria set forth in National Courier Associ-
ation v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
and examines: whether banks have generally provided the services in question; whether
banks generally provide functionally or operationally similar services which render them
particularly well-equipped to provide the proposed services; and whether banks provide ser-
vices integrally related to those in question, requiring that they be provided in a specialized
form. See id. at 1237.
The Board will also consider "any. . . factor that an applicant may advance to demon-
strate a reasonable or close connection or relationship of the activity to banking." See 49
Fed. Reg. 806 (1984). Finally, in order to approve an activity, the Board must further deter-
mine whether the activity may "reasonably... be expected to produce public benefits that
outweigh any potential adverse effects." See Schwab, 468 U.S. 207, 211 (1984).
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tions 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall. 4 In rejecting this argument, the
Court concluded that such a violation had not occurred, distin-
guishing the closed-end investment activity at issue here from the
open-end investment activity challenged in Camp.s5 The Court de-
termined that the "subtle hazards" which accompany open-end in-
vestment activity 8 were not a risk in connection with closed-end
activity.37 Further, an interpretive ruling by the Board, prohibiting
affiliate involvement in the underwriting or selling of securities, 8
limited closed-end investment activity so that, even if engaged in
by a bank, it would arguably not violate the Act." Based on the
Bank Holding Company analysis, the Court concluded that bank
affiliates may properly participate in certain activities denied to
banks in addition to those activities deemed permissible for bank
involvement within the Glass-Steagall framework.40
By adopting the Board's analysis, the ICI Court established a
practice of according the "greatest deference" 41 to Board determi-
34 IfI, 450 U.S. 46, 58 (1981).
35 Id. at 64-67.
" See supra note 27.
ICI, 450 U.S. at 65-67.
Id. at 62. The ruling placed certain restrictions on the activity of closed-end invest-
ment companies to which bank holding companies served as investment advisors. See 12
C.F.R. § 225.125(f), (g), (h) (1987). The name of such investment company could not be
similar to that of the holding company or its subsidiaries. The holding company and its
affiliates were prohibited from: purchasing securities of such investment company for their
own account, in a fiduciary capacity, or as managing agent; extending credit to the invest-
ment company; accepting such securities as collateral for credit extended for the purpose of
purchasing other such securities of the investment company; directly or indirectly partici-
pating in the sale or distribution of such securities; distributing sales literature or prospec-
tuses at its offices; expressing opinions recommending the purchase of such securities; pro-
viding lists of customer names to the investment company; and acting as investment advisor
to a fund having offices in a building perceived by the public as being associated with the
holding company or its subsidiaries. Id.
39 ICI, 450 U.S. at 62.
41 Id. at 60 & n.26.
4 See id. at 56, 68. As the Federal Reserve Board is the regulatory agency responsible
for application of the statutory scheme, the standard of review to be applied by the courts is
to show "greatest deference" to the Board's findings. See Schwab, 468 U.S. 207, 215-16
(1984); accord Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 142 (1984) ("substantial deference"); Nat-
West, 821 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988).
The decisions of the Board must be upheld if it is a reasonable construction of the
statute. Id. See also Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (reviewing decision of Environmental Protection Agency). In Chevron, the Court
noted that if the agency's "choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting pol-
icies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it un-
less it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned." Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S.
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nations. ICI was the first in a line of cases which upheld regulatory
actions sanctioning bank affiliate involvement in an increasingly
broad spectrum of securities activities.42 In 1984, the Supreme
Court, in Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System43 ("Schwab"), affirmed a Second Cir-
cuit determination 44 that a bank holding company may, within the
meaning of the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts,
acquire a discount brokerage subsidiary. 45 The Court deferred to
the Board's findings that discount brokerage services did not con-
stitute a "public sale" 46 of securities within the meaning of section
0, and that such activity was "closely related to banking" within
the meaning of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company
Act.4
s
The same year in which Schwab was decided, the Supreme
Court reviewed another challenge to Glass-Steagall in Securities
374, 382-83 (1961)).
However, courts are obligated to reject administrative constructions of a statute which
are "inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress
sought to implement." Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984) (quoting Federal Election
Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)); see Note, An
Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposal for the Reform of Glass-Steagall, 52 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 281, 311 n.172 (1986).
42 See, e.g., Schwab, 468 U.S. at 209 (discount brokerage); NatWest, 821 F.2d at 811,
(securities brokerage and investment advice offered to institutional clients); Securities In-
dus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (private placement of commercial paper with institutional investors), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 3228 (1987) [hereinafter Bankers Trust II].
"3 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
" Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
11 See Schwab, 468 U.S. at 209, 214-16. Charles Schwab & Co., the subsidiary in ques-
tion, provided retail brokerage services at a discounted price. Id. at 209. In addition, it of-
fered margin lending services, custodial accounts, and account maintenance services to cus-
tomers, but did not provide investment advice. See id. at 209, 215 n.14.
48 Id. at 221. The Court held that the "public sale" of securities is only prohibited
under section 20 when performed in conjunction with the "issue," "flotation," "underwrit-
ing" or "distribution" of securities. See id. at 217; 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982). The Court ex-
pressed no opinion as to whether a "best-efforts" underwriting, in which the underwriter
acts merely as an agent for the issuer, is a prohibited activity under Glass-Steagall. See
Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217-18; 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982). This issue has not yet been decided by
the courts. See NatWest, 821 F.2d 810, 814 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to decide issue),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988); compare Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1062 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (suggesting that best efforts underwriting performed solely on agency basis may
constitute underwriting within meaning of Act), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) with L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 172 (best efforts underwriting not technically "under-writing").
47 See Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217-18; 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
48 See Schwab, 468 U.S. at 214-16; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
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Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System49 ("Bankers Trust I"). Bankers Trust, a state member
bank, had served as agent for issuers of commercial paper by plac-
ing these issues with institutional investors.50 In response to a chal-
lenge by a securities industry trade association, the Court reversed
the District of Columbia Circuit's decision5 which had upheld a
Board determination 52 that commercial paper was not a "note ...
or other security" within the meaning of sections 16 and 21.11 Re-
jecting a narrow interpretation of the statutory language, the Court
held that commercial paper is a security for purposes of Glass-
Steagall,54 but expressed no opinion as to whether Bankers Trust's
placement activity violated the Act's prohibition against "issuing,
underwriting, selling or distributing" securities. 55
On remand,5" the district court rejected the contention that
Bankers Trust's selling of securities upon the order and for the
account of customers was an activity permitted under section 16,
and warned of "subtle hazards" created by such practices." The
court also stated that Bankers Trust had engaged in underwriting
and distribution of securities in violation of sections 16 and 21 of
the Act.8 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the lower court and adopted the Board's reasoning in
40 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
10 See id. at 140. As part of this service, Bankers Trust engaged in the solicitation of
both issuers and prospective purchasers through advertisements. See Securities Indus. Ass'n
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F. Supp. 695 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 807 F.2d
1052 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987). Bankers Trust offered short-term credit at
special rates to commercial paper issuers in order to finance portions of issues. Id. To com-
ply with the Board's June 1985 policy statement, see Statement Concerning Applicability
of the Glass-Steagall Act to the Commercial Paper Placement Activities of Bankers Trust
Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 86,270, Banker's Trust
changed the scope of its investment services. See Securities Indus. Ass'n, 627 F. Supp. at
697. Specifically, Bankers Trust continued to place commercial paper with large financial
institutions, but discontinued its practices of lending to finance issues, purchasing portions
of such issues, and taking the paper as collateral for loans. Id.
51 A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136
(1982), rev'd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
12 See A.G. Becker, 693 F.2d at 143, 151-52.
3 See id. at 143; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh) & 378 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 140 (1984).
Id. at 160 n.12.
' 627 F. Supp. 695 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 807 F.2d 1052 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228
(1987).
17 Id. at 704-06.
Is Id. at 696. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System59 ("Bankers Trust 11"). In his opinion, Judge
Bork accorded the administrative decision "the greatest defer-
ence," 60 and accepted the Board's determination that the activity
was within the permissive language of section 16.61 The opinion
further supported the Board's view that Bankers Trust's private
placement of commercial paper did not constitute "underwriting"
of securities.62 The court reasoned that only a public offering
would overcome the section 16 exemption."3
Banker's Trust II, while clearly dispositive of the issue at bar,
failed to address such issues as the legal consequences of the
agency relationship involved in a "best efforts" underwriting.64
Notwithstanding the issues left unanswered by the decision, sev-
eral commercial banks have announced their intention to expand
'9 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1056. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81 Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1058.
62 Id. at 1062.
" Id. The court found the distinction between public offerings and private placements
to be reasonable because it is supported by congressional intent in coexisting securities leg-
islation, and relates to matters that Glass-Steagall sought to address. Id. The transactions
sanctioned under section 16 include dealing in securities and stock for customers, but not
for the bank's own account. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. II 1984). The section fur-
ther provides that "the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock." Id.
See supra note 1. The language of section 16 is arguably inconsistent with that of section 21,
which provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful:
For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar or-
ganization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distribut-
ing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, de-
bentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent
whatever in the business of receiving deposits ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982). In Bankers Trust H, the appellee had contended that while the
activity in question may have been permissible under section 16, it was nonetheless prohib-
ited by section 21. See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1058. The court agreed that both
sections prohibited underwriting, but noted that section 16 allows a commercial bank to sell
securities on account of its customers, yet, section 21 denies it the power of "selling" securi-
ties. Id. The court then relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Bankers Trust I that
"[sections] 16 and 21 seek to draw the same line" between commercial and investment
banking, Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984), and concluded that the terms "issuing,"
"selling," and "distributing" in section 21 cannot be read to defeat section 16's permissive
effect. See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1057-58. The court's interpretation of "underwrit-
ing" has been criticized as being overly restrictive. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 716. It
has been suggested that such a term should be defined generically, in light of possible
hazards feared by Congress without reference to specific features in the market. Id.
S" See Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d at 1062. The court found it unnecessary to resolve
the agency relationship issue because it agreed with the Board's conclusion that an "'under-
writing' defeats the section 16 exemption only if it includes a public offering." Id.; see supra
notes 46 & 63 and accompanying text.
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their commercial paper placement activities, 5 and, through their
affiliates, have gained Board approval to engage in underwriting of
these securities to a limited extent.6
In the most recent judicial expansion of the securities activi-
ties of bank affiliates, Securities Industry Association v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("NatWest"),67 the
court denied a petition seeking review of a Board determination.'
"' See, e.g., Berg, Banks Gear Up to Place Paper, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1987, at D6,
col. 5 (Citicorp and Bank of America).
Is See Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 738, 738 & n.3 (1987) (municipal
revenue bonds, residential mortgage related securities); PNC Fin. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
742, 742 (1987) (municipal revenue bonds, commercial paper); Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co.,
Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 473 (1987) (municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage related securities, consumer receivables-related securities, commercial paper)
[hereinafter, cumulatively the Section 20 Applications].
The Federal Reserve has recently approved several applications allowing bank holding
companies to underwrite commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, municipal revenue
bonds and consumer-receivable backed securities by locating this activity in a subsidiary
whose principal business is underwriting government securities. See, e.g., PNC Fin. Corp.,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 742, 742 (1987). Such subsidiaries are permitted to engage in underwriting
government securities because banks themselves may engage in this activity. See 12 U.S.C. §
24 (Seventh) (Supp. II 1984).
It is widely recognized that Glass-Steagall does not bar bank participation in all invest-
ment banking activity. Specifically, banks may underwrite and deal in debt securities
outside the United States, see 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) (1987); in certain U.S. government
securities and state and municipal general obligation securities, see 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(Supp. II 1984); and in certificates of deposit, see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559
(1982) (certificate of deposit not a security). These are merely examples of the securities
activities permissible under Glass-Steagall. The Act's attempt to separate investment bank-
ing from commercial banking seems futile considering that approximately forty-two percent
of domestic underwriting markets were open to banks. See BANK PROFITABILITY, supra note
6, at 274.
It is important to recognize that the securities involved in the Section 20 Applications
were not among those exempted from the Glass-Steagall prohibition. See 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh) (Supp. H 1984). The Board approved the applications based on a finding that the
subsidiary would not be "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale, or distribution . . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities." See 12
U.S.C. § 377 (1982); Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 729, 729 (1987); Chase Man-
hattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367, 368 (1987); Banker's Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 138, 140-46 (1987). The Board's determination that these government obligations,
which are eligible securities, are not securities within the meaning of section 20, caused
then-Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell to vigorously dissent from the Board's ap-
proval of these applications, while joining in approval of similar applications in which the
subsidiary was engaged in other activities. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 729, 729 (1987) (mortgage subsidiary); Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367,
367 (1987) (commercial finance subsidiary). But see Chemical Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731,
735 (1987) (dissenting statement of Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell); Citicorp, J.P.
Morgan & Co., Banker's Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 505 (1987) (same).
6 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988).
Is See id. at 811; National Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584, 595 (1986).
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The Board had concluded that a combined offering of securities
brokerage services and investment advice by a bank affiliate did
not constitute a "public sale" of securities within the meaning of
sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall. 9 This activity was considered
a "proper incident to banking" within the meaning of section
4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act.70 By upholding th6
Board's determination, the court increased the list of permitted
bank affiliate activities by effectively combining the holdings of
ICI and Schwab. Furthermore, the court suggested that a "subtle
hazards" analysis is not necessary when it is determined that the
challenged activities fall squarely within specific terms of the Act.71
The court found no "subtle hazard" which would require a rejec-
tion of NatWest's application.72 This line of judicial and regulatory
decisions has enabled bank holding companies to offer diversified
products and services heretofore foreclosed. However, some com-
mentators have pointed out the dangers of such an ad hoc ap-
proach to expansion of bank participation in the securities indus-
try.73 In recent years, widespread demands for reform of the
regulatory structure and significant changes in the financial ser-
vices industry have prompted increasing legislative attention.
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE:
THE COMPETITIVE EQUALITY BANKING ACT OF 1987
The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA")74
was signed into law on August 10, 1987.7 This statute was primar-
" NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812. See supra note 33 for a discussion of sections 20 and 32.
70 NatWest, 821 F.2d at 812. See supra note 8 for a discussion of section 4(c)(8).
71 NatWest, 821 F.2d at 816 & n.8.
72 Id. at 817; see supra note 27. See also Banker's Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1069 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (courts should defer to agency's subtle hazards analysis; presence of one subtle
hazard insufficient to mandate prohibition of practice), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987).
"' See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 73. Allowing banks access to the realm of
finance may "increase the instability of financial markets in the face of major external
shocks and also, at the same time, compromise the capacity of our commercial banking sys-
tem to respond quickly and flexibly to the increased credit demands it would face under
such circumstances." Id.
" Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
"' See Corwin, The New Banking Bill: A Guide Through its Moratorium Maze, in THE
COMPETITE EQUALITY BANKING ACT OF 1987 3 (1987). The President had threatened to veto
the legislation due to his dissatisfaction with the provisions regarding the recapitalization of
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). See id. In his signatory
statement, the President discussed the statute's moratorium provision:
They will . . . impose a retrogressive moratorium on the ability of Federal bank
regulators to authorize new real estate, securities, and insurance products and ser-
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ily enacted to recapitalize the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation.76 The CEBA also contained provisions which imposed
restrictions on the activities of "nonbank banks";77 broadened au-
thority permitting emergency acquisitions of failing financial insti-
tutions;78 set forth temporary expedited funds availability sched-
ules;79 and imposed a moratorium on certain nonbanking activities
vices to consumers until March 1, 1988. My willingness to sign this bill is based in
part upon its statement of congressional intent not to renew or extend the morato-
rium on the granting of needed new authorities for banks beyond March 1, 1988,
whether or not subsequent legislation is passed by the Congress. It is also my clear
understanding that this legislation will not impede the ability of Federal banking
agencies to authorize banks and bank holding companies to conduct banking ac-
tivities permitted under current law.
Statement by President Ronald Reagan upon signing H.R. 27, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 662.
71 See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 301-07, 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 585-604. The recapitalization plan was
implemented by the creation of a "Financing Corporation" which possesses the power to
issue nonvoting stock and debt. See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 302(c)(1), 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 587. Each Federal Home Loan Bank is
required to invest in the Financing Corporation, with the cumulative amount of investment
limited to $3 billion. Id. at 585. The recapitalization will be carried out by the FSLIC issu-
ing capital stock and capital certificates which in turn will be purchased solely by the Fi-
nancing Corporation. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference,
133 CONG. REc. H6889, H6889 (daily ed. July 31, 1987) [hereinafter Explanatory
Statement].
7 See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 101(c)(1), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 554. For a discussion of "nonbank banks" and the Competitive Equal-
ity Banking Act, see also supra note 13.
7' See Jones, FDIC Emergency Authority Under the Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987 in THE ComPrrnv EQUALrry BANKING AC OF 1987 35 (1987); see generally
Competitive Equality Banking Act §§ 501-09, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101
Stat.) 552, 623-35. Title V of the Competitive Equality Banking Act, the "Financial Institu-
tions Emergency Acquisitions Amendments of 1987," was enacted to permit FDIC-assisted
interstate acquisitions of failing banks. See Jones, supra. Section 502 permits out of state
banks or holding companies to acquire institutions which are in danger of failing. See Com-
petitive Equality Banking Act § 502, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552,
623-29. Further, holding companies or insured banks in danger of closing may be acquired
by out of state holding companies if the former entity owns a bank subsidiary or subsidiar-
ies with aggregate banking assets of $500 million or more; such subsidiaries comprise thirty-
three percent or more of the holding company's banking assets. See id. at 624. See also
Explanatory Statement, supra note 76, at H6904.
7' See Competitve Equality Banking Act § 603, 1987 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(101 Stat.) 552, 637. The "Expedited Funds Availability Act" aims to improve the nation's
check processing system. See generally id. (Act limits time period between check deposits
and availability of cash for withdrawals). Schedules which take effect on September 1, 1988
provide limits on the time period which elapses before deposited funds are made available
for the bank customer. The provisions contain modifications of the schedules which allow
limited cash withdrawals. See Explanatory Statement, supra note 76, at H6906.
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of banks, bank affiliates and foreign banks."0
Section 201(b), which contains the moratorium provision, ap-
plies to foreign banks which are subject to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act; bank holding companies, their subsidiaries and affiliates;
and insured banks and their subsidiaries and affiliates.81 This sec-
tion precludes federal banking agencies from authorizing or al-
lowing, by "action, inaction or otherwise," 2 these institutions to
engage in securities activities during a one year period. 3 Any activ-
ity which involves the "flotation, underwriting, public sale, dealing
in or distribution of securities," agency approval of which would
require a determination that the applicant not be "engaged princi-
80 See Competitive Equality Banking Act §§ 201-05, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 581-85. Section 201 provides in pertinent part:
(a)... The provisions of this section shall apply during the period beginning on
March 6, 1987, and ending on March 1, 1988.
(b)... (1) A foreign bank or other company covered by subsection (c) of section 8
of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106(c)) shall not, under any
provision of law which is not applicable to domestic bank holding companies, ex-
pand any activity in which it is engaged pursuant to that subsection by acquiring
an interest in, or the assets of, a going concern....
(2) A Federal banking agency may not authorize or allow by action, inaction,
or otherwise any bank holding company or subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any for-
eign bank or other company subject to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
(12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.) under section 8(a) of the International Banking Act of
1978 (12 U.S.C. 3106(a)), or any insured bank or subsidiary or affiliate thereof to
engage in the United States to any extent whatever -
(A) in the flotation, underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of
securities if that approval would require the agency to determine that the
entity which would conduct such activities would not be engaged principally
in such activities,
(B) in any securities activity not legally authorized in writing prior to March
5, 1987, or
(C) in the operation of a nondealer marketplace in options.
Subparagraph (B) shall not affect (i) activities in which any bank holding com-
pany or subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any foreign bank or other company subject
to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 under section 8(a) of the International
Banking Act of 1978, or any insured bank or subsidiary or affiliate thereof acts
only as an agent; (ii) activities which had been lawfully engaged in prior to March
5, 1987; or (iii) sales or transactions closed on or before June 30, 1987.
Competitve Equality Banking Act § 201(a), (b), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101
Stat.) 552, 581-82.
8' See id. § 201(b)(2), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582.
82 Id. This phrase was added during the deliberations of the Conference Committee by
way of the so-called "missing page" amendment offered by Rep. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).
See Corwin, supra note 75, at 4-5.
11 Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(a), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(101 Stat.) 552, 581.
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pally" in such activities, is prohibited during the moratorium.84
The moratorium's scope also extends to "any securities activity not
legally authorized in writing prior to March 5, 1987 ' 's5 and to the
"operation of a nondealer marketplace in options."8 " The CEBA
qualifies the requirement of written legal authorization by provid-
ing that it shall not affect activities in which the entity "acts only
as an agent, ' 87 those "lawfully engaged in prior to March 5, 1987 ' '8 s
and "sales or transactions closed on or before June 30, 1987. ' '89
Congress' intent in enacting CEBA is clarified by sections
20290 and 203.1 The former provision expressly permits continued
11 Id. at 582. This provision was apparently included to impose the moratorium on ex-
tensions of permissible subsidiary activity such as that approved by the Board in the Sec-
tion 20 Applications. See supra note 66.
" See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2)(B), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582.
" See id. § 201(b)(2)(C), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582.
This provision is aimed at placing a moratorium on activity previously approved by the
board in applications similar to the one made by Security Pacific Corporation in 1987. See
Security Pac. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 622 (1987). In this order, the applicant gained ap-
proval to operate a system for trading put and call options on U.S. Treasury Securities
through a subsidiary, Security Pacific Options Trading Corp. ("SPOT"). Id. at 623. SPOT
would act only as an agent for participants it selected to become members of the system.
Also, these such participants would not deal directly with each other, but would execute
transactions through a third party unaffiliated with Security Pacific Corp. Id.
V Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2)(C)(i), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582. See Corwin, supra note 75, at 8.
" Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2)(C)(ii), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582. Commentators have questioned whether this exemption is "in-
dustry-generic or institution-specific." See Corwin, supra note 75, at 8. In other words, in
order to take advantage of the exemption, an entity is arguably required to have engaged in
the given activity itself prior to March 5, 1987.
81 Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2)(C)(iii), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 582.
O0 Id. § 202, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 584. Section 202
provides:
Nothing in section 201 may be construed to prevent a Federal banking agency
from issuing any rule, regulation, or order pursuant to its legal authority in exis-
tence on the day preceding the date of enactment of this Act to expand the securi-
ties, insurance, or real estate powers of banks or bank holding companies that are
subject to the moratorium established under section 201 if the effective date of
such rule, regulation, or order is delayed until the expiration of such moratorium.
Id.
9, See id. § 203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 584. Section 203
provides:
(a).. . It is the intent of the Congress, through the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Banking, Fi-
nance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, to conduct a compre-
hensive review of our banking and financial laws and to make decisions on the
need for financial restructuring legislation in the light of today's changing finan-
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regulatory action authorizing activities affected by the moratorium,
subject only to the requirement that the effectiveness of such deci-
sions be stayed until the expiration of the moratorium.92 In section
203, Congress revealed its determination "to conduct a comprehen-
sive review of our banking and financial laws" before the expira-
tion of the moratorium.9
3
Title I of the CEBA expands the scope of restrictions imposed
upon transactions between banks insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and their affiliates through the
adoption of section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. 4 The section
was intended to supplement the restrictions found in section 23A,
which govern extensions of credit by such banks to their affili-
ates.95 In addition to enumerating certain prohibited transac-
tions, 6 section 23B requires that some transactions be entered into
cial environment both domestic and international before the expiration of such
moratorium.
(b)... It is the intent of the Congress not to renew or extend the moratorium
established under section 201 whether or not subsequent banking legislation is
passed by the Congress.
Id.
92 Id. The Board has included language in its orders to this effect. For example, in the
Section 20 Application submitted by Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co. and Bankers Trust, the
following statement appeared:
In its consideration of this case, the Board has noted that on March 27, 1987,
the United States Senate passed legislation that, if enacted, would prohibit Board
approval between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988, of any application, such as
the present proposals, that would permit a bank holding company to engage in the
underwriting or public sale of securities on the basis that it was not "engaged
principally" in such activity within the meaning of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall
Act. This prohibition would not apply to applications pending prior to the date of
enactment of the legislation if the Board delays the effective date of the decision
until the expiration of the moratorium .....
... [T]he Board calls to Applicants' attention that they may be required by
subsequent Congressional action to cease their ineligible underwriting and dealing
activities approved in this Order.
Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 502 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
11 See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 203, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(101 Stat.) 552, 584.
9' See id. § 102, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564-66.
See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 102(b), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 565. Member banks or their subsidiaries are prohibited from:
(A) ... purchas[ing] as [a] fiduciary any securities or other assets from any affili-
ate unless such purchase is permitted- (i) under the instrument creating the fi-
duciary relationship, (ii) by court order, or (iii) by law of the jurisdiction gov-
erning the fiduciary relationship; and (B) whether acting as principal or fiduciary,
shall not knowingly purchase or otherwise acquire, during the existence of any
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on terms "substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such
bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for compara-
ble transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated companies. '97
A good faith standard is applied where no comparable transactions
are present.98 Section 23B further provides that transactions with
third parties which benefit an affiliate are transactions with affili-
ates. 9 Additionally, an anti-fraud provision, which prohibits mem-
ber banks, their subsidiaries or their affiliates from representing in
advertisements or agreements that the bank is "responsible for the
obligations of its affiliates," is contained in this section. 100
Enactment of the CEBA has resulted in increased attention to
the Glass-Steagall dilemma, and has prompted numerous calls for
reform. It is submitted that the continued restraints imposed by
the moratorium will create uncertainty in the financial services in-
dustry and frustrate decisions concerning allocation of resources.
For these reasons and others, prompt congressional action on this
matter is necessary.
underwriting or selling syndicate, any security if a principal underwriter of that
security is an affiliate of such bank.
(2) ... Subparagraph (B) ... shall not apply if the purchase or acquisition of such
securities has been approved, before such securities are initially offered for sale to
the public, by a majority of the directors of the bank who are not officers or em-
ployees of the bank or any affiliate thereof.
Id.
I See Competitive Equality Banking Act § 102(a), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564. Transactions subject to this restriction include "covered transac-
tions" with affiliates; sales of assets or securities to an affiliate, including those subject to a
repurchase agreement; payment or the rendering of services to an affiliate; transactions in
which an affiliate acts as an agent or broker, or is paid for rendering services to a bank; and
transactions with a third party in which an affiliate participates or has a financial interest.
Id. "Covered transactions" of an affiliate of a member bank, are defined as:
(A) a loan or extension of credit to the affiliate; (B) a purchase of or an investment
in securities issued by the affiliate; (C) a purchase of assets, including assets sub-
ject to an agreement to repurchase, from the affiliate, except such purchase of real
and personal property as may be specifically exempted by the Board by order or
regulation; (D) the acceptance of securities issued by the affiliate as collateral se-
curity for a loan or extension of credit to any person or company; or (E) the issu-
ance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including an endorsement or
standby letter of credit, on behalf of an affiliate.
12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982); see Competitive Equality Banking Act § 102(d)(3), 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564 (adopting this definition).
11 Competitive Equality Banking Act § 102(a)(1)(B), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564.
OD Id. § 102(a)(3), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564.
100 Id. § 102(c), 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 552, 564.
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PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE LEGISLATIVE
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Although reform of the financial services industry appears to
have gained widespread support, no single proposal has gained
general acceptance. This Note examines several propositions, fo-
cusing primarily on those advanced by E. Gerald Corrigan, Presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,101 the FDIC,10'
and Thomas F. Huertas, Vice-President of Citicorp103 and the
Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Represen-
tatives. 10 4
The Corrigan Proposal
This proposal embraces the view that the separation of bank-
ing and commerce should remain intact regardless of the type of
reform adopted. 105 The author provided support for this concept
by emphasizing that insulation of the bank from the commercial
entity would require total segregation. 0 6  Not surprisingly,
101 E.G. CORRIGAN, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View, in FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT 1986 3.
'02 MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6.
103 Huertas, Redesigning Regulation: The Future of Finance in the United States (pa-
per prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium, Restructuring the Fi-
nancial System, Aug. 22, 1987).
I04 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10.
10 E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 24. Mr. Corrigan characterizes his position as a
"widely held view." Id. The Committee, however, explicitly rejected his analysis, stating.
Mr. Corrigan ... takes the position that we must preserve and strengthen the
separation between banking, on the one hand, and nonfinancial business and com-
merce, on the other, and that this requires a strict prohibition against commercial
firms owning and controlling insured depository institutions. He presents no anal-
ysis to explain why such a prohibition is needed, however, nor does he indicate
that there have been any harmful effects or risks arising from the existing in-
stances of such ownership.
... His position is only that commercial firms should not control banks or
thrifts; he takes no position on banks or thrifts controlling commercial firms.
The committee finds this aspect of Mr. Corrigan's policy blueprint inconsis-
tent with his supportive position on financial services integration.
. . . [His] position on commercial firms also has serious anticompetitive
implications.
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65 (footnote omitted).
10 E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 25. The commentators embrace differing views on
the insulation issue. Some argue that it is possible to insulate banks from their affiliates.
Therefore, consolidated supervision of the entity owning the bank and restrictions on the
activities which may be engaged in by such affiliates are unnecessary. See Huertas, supra
note 103, at 19. This position is exemplified by the FDIC proposal, the Committee report
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Mr. Corrigan concluded that this type of insulation would be im-
practical and would likely remove any incentive for such
affiliation.'07
The Corrigan proposal offers a framework for regulatory re-
form based on functional supervision.108 It further recommended
regulatory supervision of financial holding company activity. 0 9 Mr.
Corrigan outlines permissible organizational structures compre-
hended by the proposal, which include the financial holding com-
pany,110 the commercial-financial conglomerate,"' the bank hold-
and by Mr. Huertas himself. In contrast, other authorities, including Mr. Corrigan, believe
that such restrictions are mandated by the unfeasibility of insulation. Id. at 19-20 & n.7.
107 E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 25. The Committee rejected this contention,
stating:
The committee rejects this view that insulation, in order to accomplish its primary
purpose of assuring that the deposit insurance system provides protection only to
the insured institutions directly under its coverage, must be so constraining as to
destroy the benefits of holding company affiliation. One of the principal benefits
of the financial services holding company structure considered in this report is the
enhanced capital mobility that would be afforded between different types of finan-
cial services, including banking. The insulation that would be needed between the
ongoing operations of the banking and nonbanking affiliates in a holding company
would in no way impair this capital mobility.
CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 41.
108 E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 44. Under a functional regulation approach, activ-
ities performed by a subsidiary of a financial holding company would be subject to regula-
tory supervision by the same authority which oversees the activities if they had been per-
formed by an individual company. In addition, the regulatory requirements would not be
more burdensome solely due to the entity's status as a subsidiary. See CoMMrrEE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 82. The Committee endorsed "functional regulation" with respect to hold-
ing company activities, but declined to embrace the concept as applied to other aspects of
financial services regulation. Id. at 58.
109 E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 43. Mr. Corrigan suggested that a "Financial Ser-
vices Oversight Board" be created to insure the uniform application of the term "financial
services" among the various classes of institutions. Id. Moreover, Mr. Corrigan feared that
the lack of such uniformity would eliminate the possibility of maintaining a meaningful
distinction between "banking/finance" and "commerce," causing competitive disparities
among the different types of institutions. Id.
110 Id. at 39. Although a financial holding company could not be owned by a commercial
firm, it may offer non-insured transaction accounts. Id. A financial holding company could
obtain access to the large-dollar payments system, and limited access to the discount win-
dow by subjecting itself to interest earning liquidity reserves. Id. See infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the acquisition of an insured bank or thrift by a financial
holding company would convert its status to that of a bank or thrift holding company. See
E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 39.
"' See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 39. Similar to financial holding companies,
commercial-financial conglomerates would be permitted to perform a wide variety of non-
bank financial activities. Unlike the former, such conglomerates could engage in commercial
functions. However, commercial-financial conglomerates would be prohibited from control-
ling a bank or thrift, gaining access to the payments system, and borrowing at the discount
19871
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ing company' 12 and the single-entity structure."'
Under this approach, financial holding companies would be
permitted to participate in the securities and insurance industries,
but their banking activity would be limited to offering "transaction
accounts.""' 4 Such entities could not obtain access to the large dol-
lar payments system 15 or the discount window"i6 if they were con-
trolled by commercial firms.117 Another type of institution, the
commercial-financial conglomerate, would be permitted to be part
of a commercial entity, but would be prohibited from owning de-
posit-taking institutions."18 Mr. Corrigan's scheme provides for the
expansion of bank holding company activities to include a full
range of financial services. 119 However, these companies may not
window. Id; see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
"1 See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 41. Mr. Corrigan's proposal requires that
entities controlling a bank or thrift be unaffiliated with commercial enterprises. Id. at 41.
However, they would be permitted to offer a full range of financial services and could own
insured banks having access to the payments system and the discount window. Id. In addi-
tion, they may be subject to liquidity reserves. Id.
13 Id. at 34. This category would include the thousands of broker/dealers, insurance
companies and finance companies. Id.; see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
1 See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 36. Transaction accounts are defined as non-
insured balances with strict, low limits on the number of deposits and/or withdrawals per-
missible during a stated period. In addition, the principal balance may be subject to capital
losses or gains. Id.
"I Id. at 15. The large-dollar electronic payments system is operated by the Federal
Reserve Banks' FedWire system and the CHIPS system of the New York Clearing House
Association. Id. Banks make substantial daylight overdrafts on these systems. The Federal
Reserve provides "implicit insurance coverage" to the payees of these transfers, and risks
significant liability if one of these institutions fails before covering its overdrafts. See CoM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 57. Mr. Corrigan has expressed concern that allowing
nonfinancial firms to control banks would create further risks to this system. See E.G. COR-
RIGAN, supra note 101, at 37. Such nonfinancial firms may not be subject to Board supervi-
sion and could be tempted to gain improper access to the system through their bank affili-
ates. See id; see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 57-58 (concern regarding abuses
by nonfinancial parent companies not subject to same degree of regulation as holding com-
panies); MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 91-94 (discussion of risks in payment
system).
"I See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 34. The "discount window" is a process by
which member banks may receive credit in the form of liquidity assistance from the central
bank at below-market rates. See id. at 38.
117 Id. at 34.
118 Id. at 39. "Deposit-taking institutions" are entities which accept transaction depos-
its, as opposed to transaction accounts. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Mr.
Corrigan defines transaction deposits as "any liability which can be drawn down by the
depositor at par within 24 hours without prior notice and the proceeds of which can be paid
to third parties by the instruction of the depositor." See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at
35-36.
119 See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra note 101, at 41.
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be controlled by commercial firms.120 Finally, the single-entity
structure which exists today would remain a permissible option. 121
It is submitted that Mr. Corrigan's rejection of the efficacy of insu-
lation is unduly restrictive, as it is premised on the theory that
banking and commerce must remain separated. The validity of this
assumption is put into doubt by the many excellent insulation
frameworks proposed by other commentators.
The FDIC Proposal
This proposal122 presents a striking contrast to that advanced
by Mr. Corrigan. This staff study suggests that there is no policy
basis supporting the continued separation of banking and com-
merce. 23 It concludes that both Glass-Steagall and the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act are unnecessary to preserve the integrity of the
banking system 24 and argues that both acts should be gradually
repealed.' 25 Rejecting the need for regulation of nonbanking affili-
120 Id.
121 Id. at 34. Such institutions would be largely unaffected by the Corrigan proposal. Id.
However, a degree of consolidation and product diversification among these institutions
would be a likely result. See id.
In addition, the proposal advocated: the establishment of a "Financial Services Over-
sight Board," id. at 43, consolidated Board supervision of banks, thrifts, and financial hold-
ing companies having access to the discount window, id., and functional supervision of indi-
vidual activities conducted by bank, thrift, financial and commercial-financial holding
companies. Id. at 44.
122 See MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 139-66.
121 Id. at 159. This study defined commerce as all activities, including those of a nonfi-
nancial nature, that are not engaged in directly by banks. Id. at 28. The FDIC proposal
asserted that the elimination of unnecessary regulations promotes economic efficiency. Id.
Since a separation between banking and commerce is unnecessary, see infra text accompa-
nying note 131, the study suggests that there is no public policy to support the separation.
124 MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 159. The study notes that "[n]either the
Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking nor the Bank Holding
Company Act appear to be necessary to the safety and soundness of the banking system."
Id.
I 125 See id. at 161. In connection with the phasing out of Glass-Steagall, the study pro-
posed that banks first be granted the authority to underwrite municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-backed and other securitized securities and commercial paper. Id. The eradication
of the Bank Holding Company Act presents a greater risk. Id. Therefore, it demands a more
gradual phase-out, which should begin with the Board's relinquishment of its authority over
mergers and other antitrust matters. Id. The regulatory structure governing nonbank affili-
ates and the holding company would then be dismantled. Id. at 162. Once this is accom-
plished, bank tie-in regulatory authority could be transferred to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which governs other unfair and deceptive trade practices. Id. "Tie-ins exist when a
business entity attempts to condition the sale of a particular product or service upon the
purchase of another of the entity's products or services." Id. at 79. Finally, restrictions on
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ates of banks, the proposal asserts that abuses could be effectively
avoided by increasing the regulation of interaffiliate transac-
tions.'2 6 Such increased regulation would include limited adminis-
trative power to require audits and disclosure.'27
The FDIC study also advocates enactment of new legislation
extending the scope of sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Re-
serve Act'28 to include direct subsidiaries of banks.' 29 In addition,
the FDIC proposal contains a provision for making the limits on
dividend payments and general loan limits uniform for all banks. 30
It concludes that since the continued separation of banking and
commerce is unnecessary, the regulatory structure developed pur-
suant to Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act could
be largely dismantled.' 3 ' While this proposition loosely advocates
change and voices general approval of an insulation framework, it
is submitted that this proposal fails to outline precisely which
measures should be taken to effectuate the change.
The Huertas Proposal
Somewhere between the Corrigan proposal, which would pre-
serve much of the existing regulatory framework,' 32 and that of the
permissible affiliate activity would be liberalized, beginning with the addition of financial,
then nonfinancial functions. Id. at 162.
.26 Id. at 140-43. The restrictions on affiliate transactions contained in section 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act apply to all banks insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §
18280()(1) (1982). Various state and federal statutes, contain other restrictions which govern
activities such as dividend payments and general loan limits. See MANDATE FOR CHANGE,
supra note 6, at 143. These limitations may not be applicable to all banks.
The FDIC proposal advocates passage of new legislation aimed at creating uniformity in
these areas. Id. The proposal suggested that either a new section, 23C, articulating consis-
tent regulations, be added to the Federal Reserve Act, or that sections 23A, 23B and 23C be
transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Id. The study concluded that this reform
"would be sufficient to insulate banks if activity restrictions are removed from nonbank
affiliated organizations and if the banking agencies no longer have the direct regulatory con-
trol and supervisory authority of the Bank Holding Company Act over these entities." Id. at
140.
12, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 159. This power would be the sole form of
control which banking authorities could exercise over nonbanking affiliates. Id. at 160.
128 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
19 See MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 144. The term "affiliate" within the
meaning of sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act does not include nonbank
subsidiaries. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982).
o See MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 160.
121 See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
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FDIC, which would eschew much of its structure,1 33 lies a solution
proposed by Thomas F. Huertas, Vice-President of Citicorp. 34 Ad-
vocating broad expansion of permissible activities for bank affili-
ates, 135 the Huertas proposal suggests that financial services hold-
ing companies be required to provide additional capital to their
bank subsidiaries and rejects propositions which would impose
separate capital requirements on the holding company.136 Further,
the insulation problem is handled by allowing the financial services
holding company to take advantage of synergies which may be
achieved by reason of its structure, 37 while curbing its potential
for abuse through imposition of regulatory requirements. 38 These
requirements would include the preservation of existing insulation
devices and the addition of several new provisions.139
133 See MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 159. It also advocated that the modern-
ized system not feature comprehensive consolidated supervision of nonbank affiliates. Id. at
158-160.
131 See supra note 103.
135 Huertas, supra note 103, at 43-44. Presently, optimal competition does not exist in
the finance industry because the number of participants in the investment banking/securi-
ties industry is limited by Glass-Steagall. See id. at 42-43. Mr. Huertas believed that a con-
centration of resources will be reduced when the Act, a barrier to entry into the industry, is
eliminated. Id. at 43-44. By permitting bank affiliates to engage in activities which are pres-
ently restricted by Glass-Steagall, an increase in the number of participants in the industry
would occur. Therefore, the economic and political concentration within the industry would
be reduced, leading to a more perfectly competitive market. Id. at 42. The author based this
conclusion on the following economic analysis:
In economic markets, concentration means the power of a firm to raise the price of
a product or service above its competitive level. This power depends on barriers to
entry by other firms into that market. If anyone can legally enter an industry, no
firm in the industry can exercise market power, unless there are natural barriers
to entry. And, in finance, there do not appear to be any significant natural barriers
to entry. Hence, removing the artificial barriers to affiliation between banks and
non-bank firms is a sure way to reduce whatever economic power may currently
exist in banking and finance.
Id. at 42 (footnote omitted). In addition, concentration creates political power in the enti-
ties, who are then protected by Glass-Steagall's barriers to affiliation. See id. at 43. Mr.
Huertas seeks to reduce political concentration by the adoption of his proposal. Id.
I10 Id. at 26. Mr. Huertas reasoned that this requirement would further the aim of en-
suring bank soundness, while avoiding the implementation of a consolidated regulatory
structure. Id. In contrast, Mr. Corrigan proposed that all transaction accounts, including
those issued by non-banks, be subject to reserve requirements. See E.G. CORRIGAN, supra
note 101, at 36, 48.
'3 Huertas, supra note 103, at 26-27.
135 Id. at 27.
131 Id. The existing insulation provisions include dividend restrictions, section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act, and the anti-fraud and disclosure provisions of the securities laws.
Id. The new insulation devices include the bear-down, anti-fraud, extra layer, plenipotenti-
ary and enforcement provisions. Id. at 27-28. For a discussion of these provisions, see infra
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One of these, the "bear-down" provision,14° encompasses strin-
gent bank capitalization requirements coupled with regulatory au-
thority to impel divestiture in the event of continued violation."'
Further, banks which became members of financial services hold-
ing companies would be subject to supplemental capitalization re-
quirements.142 Additionally, Mr. Huertas advocates a "plenipoten-
tiary" provision,143  granting rule-making authority to bank
regulators, and imposing civil and criminal sanctions for viola-
tions.144 Regulators would also be empowered, pursuant to an en-
forcement provision, to enjoin unsafe and unsound practices by the
bank and to obtain orders requiring divestiture of the bank. 45 In
short, the Huertas proposal rejects the consolidated official regula-
tion of financial services holding companies and supports the plac-
ing of responsibility for maintaining insulation on the bank's pri-
mary federal regulator.146 It is submitted that the Huertas proposal
sets forth a comprehensive scheme based on insulation, which
could effectively control any risks associated with the reform of
notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
140 Huertas, supra note 103, at 27. The bear-down provision imposes severe penalties
for maintenance of insufficient capital, and would serve to protect the deposit insurance
system from risk, as regulators are empowered to step in before a bank is forced to close. Id.
at 25-26.
141 Id. at 25.
142 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
"I' Huertas, supra note 103, at 27-28. The plenipotentiary provision would provide fur-
ther regulation of interaffiliate transactions by granting the bank's primary federal regulator
rule-making authority in this area, thus protecting the safety and soundness of the bank. Id.
at 27.
144 Id.
141 Id. at 28. Rather than seeking cease-and-desist orders, the primary federal regulator
of the bank could utilize the injunction procedure to expedite this action. Id. In response to
such action, the enforcement provision would give the courts the power to order divestiture
of the bank, thereby preventing continued unsafe or unsound banking practices. Id.
144 Id. at 29. Mr. Huertas comments that:
This comprehensive approach concentrates responsibility for insulating the bank
in the hands of the federal regulator responsible for examining and supervising
the bank (e.g. the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks). Rather than
ossify all insulation provisions in a statute, this approach gives the bank's primary
federal regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to changing conditions and
the power to stop any practice that he considers to be unsafe and unsound. Thus,
this approach protects what needs to be protected (the bank), and assigns the job
of protection where it belongs-to the bank's primary federal regulator. This is a
much more direct and, I would argue, much more effective method of preserving
the safety and soundness of the bank than consolidated official supervision of the
entity owning the bank.
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Glass-Steagall. Moreover, concentrating supervisory authority on
the bank, rather than the holding company, will further the aim of
functional regulation, leading to a more efficient allocation of
resources.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Corrigan, FDIC and Huertas proposals were presented to
the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of
the Committee on Government Operations ("Committee") in a se-
ries of hearings conducted throughout 1986.47 The Committee
subsequently issued a comprehensive report which included its
own proposal for reform of the current system of regulation.14
The Committee found that the prohibitions contained in
Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act lead to an inef-
ficient allocation of capital because of restricted mobility.149 This
finding was based in part upon a distinction between financial cap-
ital, which is freely transferable, and organizational capital, which
is found abundantly in the banking industry and is largely immo-
bile.150 Consequently, the banking industry has experienced declin-
ing business opportunities, intense competition and falling prof-
its. 151 From the viewpoint of the Committee, increasing the scope
of activities in which bank affiliates may engage would increase in-
147 See Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 22, June 11, July 23, Sept.
18, 24 and Dec. 17, 18, 1986).
118 See CoMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 10.
,19 See id. at 25. The Committee found that banks utilize organizational capital, as
opposed to financial capital, intensively. Id. at 24. Intangible organizational capital is de-
fined as the "collective expertise, accumulated institutional wisdom, team capabilities, and
organizational 'momentum' or 'going-concern value' of each individual firm." Id. at 23. The
organizational capital of a firm is greater than the sum of the talents of the individual em-
ployees. Id. This is due to "the synergy of cooperative teamwork among many individuals of
diverse talents" which is only fully realized through organization into systems. Id. at 24.
This form of capital is not as freely transferable as purely financial capital. Id. at 24. Thus,
the restrictions imposed by Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act on the mo-
bility of organizational capital to other expanding business activities result in an inefficient
allocation of resources. Id. at 25.
150 Id. at 23-24.
' See id. at 24. During the period 1975-1984, commercial banking was one of the least
profitable selectors in the financial industry. See BANK PROFITABILITY, supra note 6, at 269.
When compared to the securities industry, which maintained an average after-tax return on
equity of 16.4 percent, commercial banking exhibited a much lower figure, measured at 12.3
percent, for the same nine year period. Id. at 270.
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dustry profitability and restore financial soundness to the banking
industry.152
Analyzing the anticompetitive effects of Glass-Steagall and the
Bank Holding Company Act, the Committee reasoned that banks
are one of a limited number of organizations which could success-
fully enter the business of investment banking. 153 The Committee
specifically advocated underwriting of corporate securities by bank
affiliates.'" Further, the Committee went on to praise the function
which "nonbank banks" serve in decreasing concentration, and dis-
closed its intention to incorporate these entities into the regulatory
framework. 55
A starting point for the Committee's analysis lies in its funda-
mental belief that regulation should focus on preserving the integ-
rity of the banking system as a whole, rather than ensuring the
continued viability of individual banks. 56 This principle led the
162 See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 24-25. The Committee reasoned that "im-
pediments to the mobility of capital among industries or lines of business reduce the invest-
ment appeal and increase the risks of loss from investing in any industry subject to these
impediments." Id. at 24.
"I' Id. at 27. The Committee noted that economies of scale and high fixed costs of entry
are common to the commercial and investment banking industries, thus making banks a
potential competitive force against investment banks. Id. Indeed, in areas where competi-
tion is permissible, banks have fared well. For instance, banks controlled forty-two percent
of the underwriting markets open to them in 1984. BANK PROFITABILITY, supra note 6, at
274.
1. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28. The Committee noted:
The corporate securities underwriting business in the United States is highly con-
centrated in a small number of major investment banking firms....
Given this high degree of concentration in the management of corporate se-
curities underwritings, the committee believes that there must be a presumption
that the entry of new competitors would be beneficial to both issuers and inves-
tors. Moreover, the fundamental shift now occurring toward greater and greater
use of the securities markets for financial intermediation both domestically and in
the international financial markets ... increases the importance of assuring the
maximum competitive efficiency and integrity in the securities markets .... [T]he
committee finds that removal of the Glass-Steagall barrier that now prohibits cor-
porate securities underwriting by domestic affiliates or subsidiaries of commercial
banks would contribute importantly to strengthening the fundamental process of
financial intermediation in the U.S. economy.
Id.
The Committee rejected the argument that limited underwriting activities, if conducted
by banks, would increase the likelihood of bank failures. Id. at 33. The increased risk
through portfolio investment would be eliminated by diversification. Id.
155 Id. at 27-28.
6I Id. at 30-31. This principle, that the safety of the entire system, rather than any
individual bank is of paramount importance, guided the Committee's analysis of the risk
factor. The Committee asserted that "no individual bank or thrift institution is, by itself,
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Committee to conclude that limited underwriting activity engaged
in by bank affiliates would not necessarily increase the risk en-
countered by the institution, 57 and that any perceived increase in
risk could be controlled by raising minimum capital require-
ments.
158
The report discussed various issues pertaining to the insula-
tion of banks from their nonbank financial and commercial affili-
ates, 5" and recommended the adoption of a comprehensive insula-
tion program rather than a system of direct regulation at the
holding company level.160 The Committee rejected consolidated
regulation of nonbank affiliates as violative of the concept of func-
tional regulation 8' and as potentially disruptive to the operation
essential to the safety of the banking and payments systems." Id. at 30. Discussing the
importance of the Federal insurance system, which provides insurance for bank deposits, the
Committee report also stressed that this system cannot be compromised by any legislative
changes. Id.
157 Id. at 33. The report found, in fact, that if such activities were limited to a stated
percentage of the bank's activity, the effects of diversification of investment would ensure
that riskiness would not increase. Id.
"I Id. In consideration for protecting the integrity of the system, the report concluded
that increased minimum capital requirements would eliminate the risk of insolvency. Id. at
33-34.
'" See id. at 38-45. The insulation system recommended by the Committee, sought to
obviate the need for consolidated regulatory supervision of the holding company and non-
bank affiliates and included a complete prohibition of interafflliate bank loans. Id. at 78. In
addition, all financial services holding companies would have to be "substantially publicly
owned." Id. at 80. The report contended that financial service holding companies and their
nonbank affiliates would be able to easily obtain credit from uninsured sources. Id. at 78.
Also, bank affiliates would be precluded from purchasing debt or equity securities or invest-
ment assets from a nonbank affiliate. Id.
The report urges that legislation be enacted which specifically prohibits deposit insur-
ance funds from aiding the shareholders or business interests of the holding company. Id. at
79. This legislation, in the Committee's opinion, would allow a Federal insurance agency to
place insured institutions in protective custody upon a finding of repeated violations. Id.
Under the insulation scheme, a financial services holding company would be required to
reimburse the deposit insurance fund for all payments made as a result of the closing and
liquidation of an insured institution. Id. at 80. Finally, the insulation system would include
regulation of cross-marketing programs among affiliates to protect the public from unfair
competition. Id. at 81. See also supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
,60 Id. at 78.
"I Id. at 38-39. Such a system would lead to serious inequities. The report stated that:
[The banking industry] would object strongly to the imposition by any holding
company oversight agency of similar risk-related regulations or controls over these
separate subsidiaries if [its] competitors-presumably securities firms without
banking affiliates-were not subject to the same limits. Risk-related controls im-
posed on a holding company securities subsidiary to which independent securities
firms were not subject would clearly create a competitive disparity that could put
the holding company subsidiaries at a fundamental disadvantage.
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of the securities markets.6 2 Significantly, this proposal explicitly
concluded that insulation may be accomplished without destroying
the advantages implicit in the structure of the organization."6
The Committee Report incorporated these findings into a pro-
posal which would be implemented through comprehensive struc-
tural change, rather than ad hoc expansion of permissible activ-
ity.16 4 Principal to the suggested structure is the establishment of
financial service holding companies, which would be permitted to
engage in financial service activities. 6 5 The holding company may
be controlled by any publicly owned firm, even if such firm engages
in nonfinancial activities.6 6 Only the depository institution would
be subject to comprehensive regulation. 6 The integrity and
soundness of the banking system would be maintained through in-
sulation, rather than extensive regulation of the holding company
and its nonbanking affiliates.16 The Committee speculated that
oversight of the holding company might properly be delegated to
the Board.169 Regardless of the agency chosen, its powers would
include definition of activities constituting "financial services,"
oversight of the insulation system and maintenance of capitaliza-
tion requirements applicable to financial services holding
companies. 7 0
The proposal advanced by the Committee is a comprehensive
analysis which draws on many of the desirable aspects suggested
by other commentators. Significantly, the Committee adopted the
concept of functional regulation, which has been advanced by each
of the commentators, but limits its scope.17 Further, the Commit-
Id.
I 62 Id. at 39.
163 Id. at 41-42.
'e' See id. at 73. The Committee recommended that "Congress should not adopt the
piecemeal approach of granting just selected new securities powers to banking firms or mak-
ing individual extensions to the list of permissible holding company activities." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
165 Id. at 74.
168 Id. For a non-financial entity to own a holding company, it must be registered as a
separately incorporated entity. Id.
117 Id. at 75.
168 Id.; see also supra note 107.
169 See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 76.
1. Id. at 76-77.
"I Id. at 58. The Committee found that in some cases the principle of insulation re-
quires that securities affiliates of banks bear a greater regulatory burden than unaffiliated
firms. Id. at 59. The Committee did however, indicate general support of the concept of
equal regulatory treatment and regulation independent of ownership or affiliation. Id. at 61.
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tee concluded that enforcement authority over securities affiliates
should be vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission,
rather than in bank regulatory agencies.1 7 2 It is submitted that this
action is reasonable in the interest of efficiency and uniformity of
application. Moreover, the Committee's advocacy of limited official
supervision at the holding company level should be incorporated
into any legislative reform undertaken;"'3 to do otherwise would
damage the profitability of nonbank subsidiaries whose competi-
tors would not be subject to such regulation.
Finally, the Committee adopted and approved the concept of
insulation. 4 It is submitted that insulation between banks and
their securities affiliates should be the centerpiece of Glass-Stea-
gall reform. The report adopted several of the ideas advanced by
Huertas, including the "bear-down" provision, which sets mini-
mum capital guidelines, and the enforcement provision. These
safeguards will provide a powerful deterrent against excessive risk
taking and unsound banking practices. Most significantly, the issu-
ance of the Committee Report evinces Congressional resolve to un-
dertake comprehensive reform.
CONCLUSION
The last decade has been marked by an increasingly strong
and widespread conviction that the regulatory system imposed by
Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act has become
inefficient and unworkable. Expansion of permissible bank activity
by regulatory and judicial action on an ad hoc basis has been ap-
plauded by the banking industry. This approach, however, leaves
the existing regulatory system intact, forcing institutions to face
administrative burdens and benefits not encountered by partici-
pants in other industries. 175
To remedy this inequity, commentators have generally em-
braced a system of functional regulation.7 6 Other aspects of their
proposals for reform have unfortunately not commanded such a
broad consensus. While the task faced by Congress in this area is
formidable, the efforts undertaken by the Committee on Govern-
172 See id. at 81.
173 See id. at 76-78.
'74 See id. at 78-81.
171 See id. at 39.
176 See supra note 108.
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mental Operations exhibit an ability and willingness to forge a new
legislative structure governing the financial services industry. The
task is too important to be subsumed by partisan politics and spe-
cial interest lobbying.
It is submitted that legislative reform should reject overly re-
strictive consolidated official supervision of the holding company
structure. The separation of banking and commerce should be
largely abandoned in the interest of economic efficiency and free
competition. Most importantly, a comprehensive system of insula-
tion, such as that proposed by Mr. Huertas, should be adopted to
ensure the continued soundness of the American financial system
after Glass-Steagall reform.
Kelly A. Zazella
